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THE PARADOX OF CORRUPTION AS ANTITHESIS TO ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: DOES CORRUPTION UNDERMINE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA AND CHINA AND WHY ARE THE 
EXPERIENCES DIFFERENT IN EACH COUNTRY? 
 
Andrew White, Esq.∗  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The question of whether corruption is antithetical to economic 
development has been extensively researched and debated since the 
1960s.  This has occurred largely in connection with law and 
economic reform efforts directed by governmental development 
agencies and non-governmental organizations in Western1 countries 
toward developing countries in Africa, South America, and Asia.  
More recently, interest in this question has been rejuvenated by 
China’s dramatic economic growth (especially as contrasted with 
other states in political and economic transition), despite widespread 
corruption in that country.  While nearly all participants in the debate 
appear to agree that corruption ultimately is antithetical to long-term 
economic development, the extent to which it positively or negatively 
affects economic development in the short term depends upon highly 
contextual factors.  In different countries and regions of the world, 
factors of local culture and history, the nature of the state, the type of 
corruption and actors involved, and the political responses and 
motivations to curtail corruption all inform the answer to this question. 
                                                 
∗
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1
  In this article, the terms “West” and “Western” are used in their 
contemporary, non-geographic sense as encompassing the Americas and Western 
Europe, as well as countries such as Australia and New Zealand which are 
geographically far from Western Europe and the U.S. but culturally still very 
“Western.” 
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 Two countries are considered in this article: Indonesia and 
China.  These countries were chosen for discussion because both are 
rife with corruption, especially in public administration and, although 
both are in Asia, they represent very different cultures and political 
systems from each other.  It is suggested in this article that corruption 
in Indonesia is a significant deterrent to economic development and is 
a problem which needs to be addressed more vigorously and 
eliminated by the Indonesian government.  Corruption in Indonesia 
not only siphons-off and reallocates resources in a non-productive 
manner, it also discourages much-needed direct foreign investment.  
Paradoxically, corruption in China appears to be a useful State tool 
that actually encourages economic development in the short term, 
while creating less optimistic long-term prospects.  Due, in part, to the 
nature of China’s political system, corruption appears to advance 
economic development by slowing political reform while still 
allowing less disruptive market reforms.  Accordingly, an analysis of 
corruption as it affects economic development in Indonesia and in 
China illustrates that the extent to which corruption is antithetical to 
economic development ultimately depends upon context. 
 
II. WHAT IS CORRUPTION?  DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS 
 
 Corruption evades definition.  As has been said of beauty and 
obscenity, ironically, one could also say that corruption “lies in the 
eye of the beholder,” and that, while we may not be able to define it, 
we “know it when we see it.” 2   Moralists, for example, define 
corruption according to simple (and simplistic) terms of right and 
wrong action, akin to stealing or lying.  This moralist definition often 
supposes that there is a universal moral code, usually a Western moral 
code or some idealized version of it.  Moralists also may purport to 
incorporate prevailing local cultural norms which are likely to change 
from time to time. 
On the other hand, some scholars avoid moral absolutes in 
defining corruption.  They see such morality-based definitions as 
                                                 
2
  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).  U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Potter Stewart is oft-quoted for his statement in Jacobellis regarding 
what is obscene:  “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I 
understand to be embraced . . . . [b]ut I know it when I see it . . . .”  Id. 
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hypocritical.3  To them, definitions based on some supposed universal 
moral code are seen as ethnocentric, failing to take into account local 
cultures and norms.  These scholars instead rely on more objective 
terms usually derived from economic or legal principles.  They define 
corruption in terms of “the market” and diversion or (mis)allocation 
of scarce resources, or in terms of illegal practices which violate 
specific legal codes or administrative regulations. 
 Scholars further break down the concept of corruption into 
various subcategories according to the greater public interest or even 
public opinion.  These scholars use a “litmus test” by which 
corruption is characterized (much like acceptable “white” lies versus 
unacceptable lies) as black, white or gray, according to whether the lie 
directly and immediately benefits the public as well as the corrupt 
actors.4  Thus, for example, a public official diverting public funds 
from an intended project is seen as less corrupt (white or gray 
corruption) if his action will benefit his constituency even if his 
noblesse is tainted by what he skims for himself.  Still other scholars 
break down corruption into further typologies, such as quasi-
corruption, pre-corruption, integrative corruption and disintegrative 
corruption, in an effort to “provide some systematic method of 
approaching so complex a phenomenon.”5 
 Each of these definitions and categories has its weaknesses.  
The problems with morality-based definitions have been summarized 
above.  Legal codes often lag behind societal norms and may not be in 
sync with what is considered as corrupt conduct.  Economic principles 
are somewhat subjective, generally free-market based, and tend to 
assume that there are vaguely different standards applicable to public 
officials in comparison with private business persons.6  Definitions 
                                                 
 
3
  We apply different standards and definitions to ourselves, for 
example, when we buy tickets to a sold-out game from a scalper, or when we tip a 
maitre d’ in order to jump the queue in a crowded restaurant. 
 
4
  Simcha B. Werner, New Directions in the Study of Administrative 
Corruption, Vol. 43 No. 2 PUB. ADMIN. R. 146, 147 (1983).  
 
5
  Kate Gillespie & Gwenn Okruhlik, The Political Dimensions of 
Corruption Cleanups: A Framework for Analysis, Vol. 24 No. 1 COMP. POL. 77, 79 
(1991). 
 
6
  See, e.g., David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption 
Campaign, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 455, 455 (1999).  Kennedy also notes that a further 
dimension to this double-standard is a First World vs. Third World bias.  Practices 
characterized as corrupt when conducted by government officials in the Third 
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based upon concepts of public interest and public opinion are not only 
based upon highly transient judgments, but public interests and 
opinions are also extremely diverse and difficult to ferret out 
effectively.  Moreover, even the best efforts to “eliminate moralizing 
rhetoric and stick to the more rational language of economic 
advantage or defense of a presumptively neutral and locally adopted 
rule of law,” may still suffer from “moral opprobrium” which 
unavoidably colors the discourse regarding corruption.7 
 Corruption in the context of Indonesia and China is even more 
difficult to define because attempts at definition risk further extending 
the express or implied issue of morality into a debate over Western 
values versus Asian values.  Asian culture has been traditionally 
characterized by Western (Orientalist) writers as essentially 
“defective to the point of being immoral and corrupt . . . .”8  Asian 
legal culture, for example, may be demonized in the West as 
“immature, primitive, backward, subjective and irrational,” in contrast 
to Western laws which are seen as “developed, modern and advanced, 
objective and rational.”9  At the same time, some Asian leaders – 
especially Dr. Mahathir of Malaysia and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore 
– have fallen back on a sort of “reverse Orientalism”10 in deflecting 
Western attempts to define and combat corruption in Asia.  They 
argue that Asia has its own unique, and uniform, way of doing things 
and that Western attempts at reform are a neo-colonialist form of 
cultural imperialism. 11   This “Asian values” debate is beyond the 
scope of this article, but it is noted that any definition of corruption, 
especially as it pertains to Asia, is susceptible to criticism as being 
heavily biased in favor of Western ideology. 
  Probably the most widely-accepted definition of corruption 
often relied upon when discussing corruption in Asia, is the World 
                                                                                                                  
World may be no different than the accepted private practices of First World 
individuals and corporations.  Id. at 458. 
 
7
  Id. at 458. 
 
8
  Tim Lindsey, History Always Repeats? Corruption, Culture and 
“Asian Values”, in CORRUPTION IN ASIA: RETHINKING THE GOVERNANCE 
PARADIGM 1, 1 (Tim Lindsey & Howard Dick, eds., 2002). 
 
9
  Id. at 2 (internal citations omitted). 
 
10
  Id. at 8. 
 
11
  Id. at 9. 
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Bank definition of corruption as “the abuse of public office for private 
gain.”12  That definition, while limited to the public administration 
arena (as opposed to corruption purely in the private sector), is useful 
to the following analysis of corruption in Indonesia and China.  While 
it implicitly conceptualizes corruption in somewhat normative terms, 
essentially a violation of formal or legal norms,13 the World Bank 
definition does not imply any negative economic consequences of 
corruption.  This is an especially important factor when considering 
the premise of this article that corruption in China may have some 
positive short-term effects on the Chinese economy, despite negative 
long-term effects.  In practical terms, moreover, that definition 
extends over those areas of public corruption most frequently 
encountered in both Indonesia and China: bribery, extortion, 
patronage, nepotism, theft of state assets, and diversion of state 
revenues.  It is the World Bank definition, therefore, which underlies 
the discussions in this article. 
 
III. THE CULTURE OF CORRUPTION:  INDONESIA AND CHINA 
COMPARED 
 
 In the 1960s, in conjunction with the law and development 
movement,14 it generally was accepted that corruption was “a usual 
                                                 
12
  WORLD BANK, CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 
HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 8 
(1997), http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf.  
Although a useful definition, there may be some conduct that falls outside the scope 
of this definition but which nevertheless would generally be considered corrupt.  An 
abuse of public office, for example, might fall outside the scope of this definition if 
the abuse does not actually benefit the public official and instead benefits the public.  
Returning to an earlier example in this article, one can further question whether 
corruption exists when a public official fraudulently diverts funds from an intended 
project in another jurisdiction to benefit his own constituency.  Morality and law-
based definitions of corruption, and most economics-based definitions, would deem 
such action as corrupt. 
 
13
  Howard Dick, Corruption and Good Governance: The New 
Frontier of Social Engineering, in CORRUPTION IN ASIA: RETHINKING THE 
GOVERNANCE PARADIGM 71, 72 (Tim Lindsey & Howard Dick, eds., 2002). 
 
14
  The so-called law and development movement was largely 
spearheaded by U.S. law professors, sponsored by the U.S. government (USAID) 
and the Ford Foundation, who saw it as a way to stabilize various developing 
countries’ economic and political systems; the experiment was first introduced in 
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and expected part of the national maturation process” in developing 
countries. 15   Certain “corrupt” practices were attributed to the 
immature development of the rule of law in those countries.  In fact, 
characterizing those practices as corrupt was seen as a West-centric 
imposition of Western values on indigenous practices (such as gift-
giving or payment of tribute to authority figures).  Conduct that might 
be “viewed as corruption in the West would be interpreted differently 
within the customs of emerging economies.”16  It was suggested that 
in developing countries there was simply “a gap between law (as 
imposed by western and alien standards) and accepted informal social 
norms (sanctioned by prevailing social ethics),” into which slipped 
the “folklore,” “climate,” or “way of life” of corruption.17   
 More recent scholars, however, assert that “the theoretical 
tenet that corruption is a dependant variable of development is 
false.”18   It generally is agreed today that corruption exists in all 
countries and in all societies, at all stages of economic and political 
development.19  Even in the United States, for example, “common 
wisdom . . . indicates that corruption has now become part of the 
                                                                                                                  
Africa, with resounding failure, and later in various forms in Asia and Latin 
America over a period of about ten years.   
 
15
  Werner, supra note 4, at 147. 
16
  Daniel Kaufman, Corruption: The Facts, 107 FOREIGN POL’Y 114, 
115 (1997). 
 
17
  Werner, supra note 4, at 148 (internal comments added). 
 
18
  Id. at 148; see also Kaufman, supra note 16, at 114 (“In more 
recent times a revisionist view has held that corruption may not be inconsistent with 
development and at times may even foster it.”). 
 
19
  See, e.g., Werner, supra note 4, at 148; Isaac Ehrlich & Francis T. 
Lui, Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth, 107(S6) J. POL. 
ECON. S270, S271 (Dec. 1999); Nora M. Rubin, Notes and Comments; A 
Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global Efforts to Curb Corruption and Bribery in 
International Business Transactions: The Legal Implications of the OECD 
Recommendations and Convention for the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, 
14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 257, 265-66 (1998); but see Peter W. Schroth, American 
Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National Reports to the XVIth 
International Congress of Comparative Law: Section V, The United States and the 
International Bribery Conventions, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 593, 619 (Fall 2002) 
(“There is a silly conventional wisdom that corruption is everywhere, only in 
different forms.”). 
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national lifestyle.”20  It is said to be “endemic to United States politics, 
businesses, and social institutions.”21 
 Corruption is very different, however, in each country wherein 
it occurs.  There are wide variations from one country to the next, 
both as to the degree to which it prevails and the nature of corrupt 
activity.  As such, any analysis of corruption and its effects in 
different countries must examine the particular context of corruption 
in each country.  Depending on the country involved, factors might 
include the local culture and history, nature of the state, type of 
corruption, actors involved, and political responses and motivation to 
curtail corruption (or not).  These factors collectively form the culture 
of corruption in a given country.  Significantly, the term “culture of 
corruption” is not used in this article in the same ethnocentric and 
apologetic sense it appeared in the law and development movement, 
especially as an effort to deflect criticisms of that movement’s 
failures.22   Rather, it is used in the sense that local context is an 
important factor in discussing corruption. 
 
 A. The Culture of Corruption in Indonesia 
 
 With respect to Indonesia, it has long been said that there is a 
“culture of corruption.”23  In fact, with a diverse population of more 
than 240 million people24 spread over an archipelagic state of 17,508 
                                                 
20
  Werner, supra note 4, at 148. 
 
21
  Id.  According to a relatively recent World Bank study, 
“perceived corruption” may have “risen slightly during the 1990s in Western 
Europe and North America, but still, as of 1999, [it was indexed] at less than half of 
any other region and about one-third of the level in sub-Saharan Africa.”  Schroth, 
supra note 19, at 622, note 141 (citing Lederman, Loayza & Reis Soares, 
Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter, WORLD BANK 
WORKING PAPER NO. 2708 (2001)). 
 
22
  See Lindsey, supra note 8, at 1. 
 
23
  Gary Goodpaster, Reflections on Corruption in Indonesia, in 
CORRUPTION IN ASIA: RETHINKING THE GOVERNANCE PARADIGM 87, 87 (Tim 
Lindsey & Howard Dick, eds., 2002) (“Indonesia’s first vice-president, Mohammad 
Hatta, said this a long time ago, but it is often repeated . . . .”). 
 
24
  United States Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/geos/id.html (last visited Sept. 10, 
2006). 
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islands, 25  corruption may be Indonesia’s predominant cultural 
common-denominator.  The reasons for such widespread corruption 
are difficult to ascertain and somewhat controversial (particularly 
when so-called “Asian values” are invoked).  Indonesia’s political 
history, including recent efforts to accomplish greater government 
decentralization, may be the most important factor in shaping the 
current culture of corruption.  Other contributing factors may include 
a certain sense of resignation or acquiescence by the average person 
in Indonesia (even in the midst of widespread calls to eradicate 
corruption).  Further, there has been a lack of “staying power” by 
outside donor organizations, intermittently “ramping-up” their 
insistence for anti-corruption reforms, only to later lose momentum 
and interest. 
   Following centuries of Dutch colonialism, subsequent 
Japanese occupation during World War II, and a brief attempt after 
the war by the Dutch to regain control (prevented largely through 
intervention by the United States and Great Britain through the United 
Nations), Indonesia finally emerged as a “democracy” slightly more 
than fifty years ago.  The country’s first constitution (drafted in 1945) 
established a very basic framework of fundamental government 
institutions necessary for an effective legislature, executive, and 
judiciary.26  Despite a “thin” rule of law,27 however, that gave the 
appearance of democracy, Indonesia passed through a prolonged 
period of authoritarian rule that: “implicitly – sometimes explicitly – 
rejected the universalism of human rights as an innately Western 
concept that was alien to East Asia . . . [;] asserted the irrelevance of 
separation of powers[;] and elevated the state to a position of almost 
                                                 
25
  Republik Indonesia Portal Nasional, Posisi Gegrafis, 
http://www.indonesia.go.id/navigasiDetail.php?n avId=1&content=0 (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2006). 
 
 
26
   The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, especially 
Articles 2-17, 19-22E, and 24-25. 
 
27
  A “thin” rule of law is characterized by certain procedures and 
fundamental institutions.  This is in contrast to a “thick rule” of law, which is more 
substantive, tends to emphasize the importance of law, and may even include 
notions of “morality related to economic governance . . . regime type . . . and human 
rights.”  Erik G. Jensen, The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform, in BEYOND 
COMMON KNOWLEDGE 336, 339 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller, eds., 2003). 
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unchecked authority.” 28   Only after the fall of Soeharto’s “New 
Order” in 1998 (which spanned 32 years), did Indonesia finally 
commence “a formal constitutional transition from authoritarianism to 
a liberal representative democratic system, with a new institutional 
framework that would allow separation of powers,” in essence 
favoring a “historically weak, but now politically irresistible, Anglo-
American ‘thick’ interpretation of rule of law.”29 
 As suggested above, these political transitions from 
colonialism to authoritarianism to real democracy, coupled in turn 
with greater decentralization of the government (discussed below), 
were protracted catalysts for the pervasive culture of corruption in 
Indonesia today.  It has been observed that “[c]olonization distorts 
relationships, destroys or petrifies institutions, and corrupts men and 
women, both colonizers and colonized.” 30   The authoritarian 
governments which replaced the colonial government, in turn, were 
firmly autocratic and the state operated virtually as a family enterprise 
for the benefit of the president, his family and friends.  The Soeharto 
government, for example, was so corrupt that doing business in 
Indonesia necessarily involved a “complex web of corrupt deals and 
political payoffs,” generally tied to Soeharto’s family and cronies.31  
Thus, corrupt practices and a sense that the state (and the bureaucratic 
machinery) was above the law not only continued, but became even 
more firmly entrenched in the wake of colonialism as relationships 
and institutions were further distorted.   
 Finally, with the end of the New Order and its authoritarian 
rule, Indonesia underwent a transition from an autocracy to a real 
democracy.  The social and political disruption as Indonesia began 
reworking its fundamental institutions, however, continued to provide 
                                                 
28
  Tim Lindsey, Indonesia: Devaluing Asian Values, Rewriting Rule 
of Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW 286, 286 (Randall Peerenboom, ed., 
2004). 
 
29
  Id. at 296. 
 
30
  George J. Aditjondro, Liberating Our Colonial Mindset (Aug. 16, 
1995), http://www.hartfordhwp.com/archives/ 54b/034.html (last visited Sept. 9, 
2006) (paraphrasing ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED 217 
(Earthscan Publications 1990) (1957)). 
 
31
  Jared Levinson, Indonesia’s Odyssey: A Nation’s Long, Perilous 
Journey to the Rule of Law and Democracy, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 103, 112 
(2001).  Even Soeharto’s late wife, Siti, “was known as ‘Madame Ten Percent’, 
reflecting her share of all public contracts.”  Id. 
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a fertile climate for corruption.  Indeed, it has been observed generally 
that such transitional periods of “political modernization . . . [are] 
usually accompanied by increases in corruption.” 32 
  Decentralization of the government as part of this political 
transition has also exacerbated wide spread corruption.  Over the past 
decade, Indonesia has moved somewhat haphazardly from the highly-
centralized autocratic regime of Soeharto, through a period in the late 
1990s of politically motivated (popularly mandated, and not always 
peaceful) demands for greater administrative and political autonomy 
at the regional level, and ultimately to a more carefully crafted 
decentralization of governmental (especially fiscal) authority to the 
provincial and local governments.33  While this decentralization may 
be good for local fiscal autonomy and relieves the unnecessary 
burdens on the central government as it (inefficiently) has tried to 
administer programs across such a widely dispersed population, it 
also has created decentralized opportunities for corruption that 
previously did not exist at the provincial and local level in Indonesia.  
As provincial and local governments administer more programs and 
control more government funds and expenditures, local bureaucrats 
also now have opportunities for diversion of funds and “rent-
seeking” 34  activities: primarily bribery and collection of excess 
“administrative” fees in connection with the performance of official 
duties. 
 Indeed, most of the corruption in Indonesia is in the nature of 
rent-seeking activities by government officials.  Very low government 
salaries which encourage rent-seeking, together with a broad cultural 
                                                 
32
  Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, Vol. 108 No. 3 
Q. J. ECON. 599, 610 (1993). 
 
33
  The most significant steps toward decentralization have been 
accomplished by Law Number 18/1997; Law Number 22/1999; Law Number 
25/1999; Law Number 34/2000 (amending Law Number 18/1997); and, late in 2004, 
the enactment of Law Number 32/2004 and Law Number 33/2004, which replaced 
Law Number 22/1999 and Law Number 25/1999, respectively, regarding the 
authority of the central government (Undang-undang Nomor 18 Tahun 1997, 
Undang-undang Nomor 22 Tahun 1999, Undang-undang Nomor 25 Tahun 1999, 
Undang-undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2000, Undang-undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2004, 
and Undang-undang Nomor 33 Tahun 2004, respectively).  
 
34
  DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM 165 (2004).  “Rent-seeking” is frequently used 
in literature to refer to “using power to extract a higher price than what would be 
possible in an arm’s length or freely competitive bargain.”  Id. 
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“expectation that if anyone provides a service, there will some 
payment for it,”35 combine to foster the culture of corruption.  As one 
American scholar has observed, “[i]n a sense, the ordinary functions 
of government have been quietly “privatised” in what we would think 
of as perverse ways.”36  And, where the top strata of the state and its 
bureaucracy set an example of corruption, corruption becomes part of 
the national culture.  An editorial in the Jakarta Post recently 
explained: 
 
[i]n a hierarchical society, such as 
Indonesia’s . . . norms and values are 
defined by those at the apex of the 
societal structure. If the public perceives 
their leaders as being able to get away 
with "murder", than the only logical 
conclusion is that such behavior is 
acceptable.37 
 
This has also been characterized as the “leader-follower spillover 
effect” of corruption:  “left to itself, corruption will grow, ‘spilling 
over’ and affecting increasing portions of a given organization or 
society.”38  As Niccolò Machiavelli cautioned a half-millennium ago, 
“what the prince does the many will also soon do – for in their eyes 
the prince is ever in view.”39 
 Ironically, in the midst of this culture of corruption, the call 
for an end to “corruption, collusion, and nepotism” – korupsi, kolusi 
dan nepotisme (“KKN”) – has been a rallying cry throughout 
Indonesia for many years.  The press devotes significant attention to 
the subject and there are frequent articles in the newspapers regarding 
                                                 
35
  Goodpaster, supra note 23, at 92. 
 
36
  Id. 
 
37
  Editorial, Rooting Out Corruption, JAKARTA POST (Indonesia), 
Apr. 13 2005, available at http://www.anti 
korupsi.org/eng/mod.php?mod=publisher&op=viewarticle&artid=429. 
 
38
  Werner, supra note 4, at 149.  This theory appears to be adapted 
from basic principles of group dynamics. 
 
 
39
  Id. 
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corruption and efforts to combat it in Indonesia.40  Even the World 
Bank has moved beyond its earlier euphemistic reference to 
bureaucratic corruption in Indonesia as “common local practices,” and 
now expressly addresses the need to combat Indonesia’s corruption.41 
 Yet, there is also an air of resignation about corruption, 42 
which may be a product of its sheer magnitude in Indonesia.  
Corruption in Indonesia has long been “rampant throughout all levels 
of Indonesian society.” 43   As noted in a decision in 2005 by the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court (Makhama Konstitusi), corruption in 
Indonesia involves “almost all elements and strata in the three 
branches of the government – the executive, the legislative and 
judiciary, which colluded – directly or indirectly – to protect 
themselves, rather than checking one another in a complex democratic 
system of checks and balances.” 44   It has been observed that in 
Indonesia “[c]orruption colors every regime.  Like an old tree, its 
strong roots spread everywhere.  From the Old Order to the New 
Order to the Reform Order, corruption has continued . . . . In this 
republic, corruption is the child of every regime.”45  As pointed out 
above in this article, the Soeharto government was so corrupt that 
doing business in Indonesia generally involved corrupt payments to 
Soeharto’s family and cronies.  Likewise, subsequent presidents have 
been characterized by the Indonesian press as all having “waxed 
lyrically about eradicating corruption and launched high profile 
anticorruption campaigns,” yet until now they have “left office under 
                                                 
40
  See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 36; infra note 44; and Widoyoko, 
infra note 47. 
 
41
  DICK, supra note 13, at 71. 
 
42
  Levinson, supra note 31, at 121.  Levinson recounts a meeting of 
business people in Jakarta for a World Bank survey, after which one business 
person “sadly” told him with respect to the meeting, “Nothing will come of it.”  Id. 
 
43
  Id. at 114. 
 
44
  Ardimas Sasdi, Govt Must Not Waver in its Battle Against 
Corruption, JAKARTA POST (Indonesia), Mar. 16 2005, available at 
http://www.antikorupsi.org/eng/mod.php?mod=publisher&op=viewarticle&artid=4
16.  As reported by Sasdi, the Constitutional Court ruled on February 17, 2005 that 
the Corruption Eradication Commission (“KPK”), lacks authority to address graft 
cases that arose before its establishment in 2003.  Id. 
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  Levinson, supra note 31, at 113-14 (citing Editorial, Corruption, 
The Child of Every Regime, MEDIA INDONESIA (Indonesia), Feb. 23, 2001). 
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a cloud of suspicion of having facilitated, if not directly participated 
in, the misappropriation of state funds.”46   In fact, the Indonesian 
press is not optimistic about current President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s pledge to combat corruption either.  It has been 
observed by the press that the “President inherited the same corrupt 
system that had been built up over decades,”47 and that “[w]ith the 
lack of political will, corrupt legal system, inconsistency in law 
enforcement and a penchant for the good life, the possibility of 
success for the government’s anticorruption program is in fact 
slim.”48  Even with some dramatic successes in combating corruption, 
the opinion in Indonesia remains that “we have been in this situation 
before – high profile case, big headlines, severe punishment, reprieve 
and back to business as usual.” 49   The culture of corruption in 
Indonesia persists despite reform efforts. 
 
 B. The Culture of Corruption in China 
 
 A relatively recent article by Chinese economist Shuntian Yao 
eloquently summarizes that: 
 
[s]ome people hold the view that China’s 
corruption problems have their root deep 
in the Chinese culture.  They argue that 
the Chinese people, as well as most of 
their counterparts in Asian countries, 
have a long tradition of placing personal 
connections above the law, and that this 
is the real source of corruption.  They 
conclude that, no matter what political 
system China chooses, the corruption 
problem can never be avoided.  Many 
CCP officials and business bigwigs 
                                                 
46
  Editorial, supra note 37. 
 
47
  J. Danang Widoyoko, Awaiting the results of SBY antigraft 
campaign, JAKARTA POST (Indonesia), Oct. 20, 2005, available at 
http://www.antikorupsi.org/eng/mod.php?mod=publisher&op=viewarticle&artid=4
52. 
 
48
  Sasdi, supra note 44. 
49
  Editorial, supra note 37. 
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agree with this view, although they do 
not admit it in public.  I have had 
discussions with several friends who are 
either CCP officials or very successful 
businessmen; all of them privately 
supported this view [sic].   They even 
argued that corruption was not too bad, 
and that if you could take advantage of it, 
it could work for you very efficiently, 
and that, after all, you had to accept it if 
you wanted to survive in China.50 
 
Yao disputes the “culture-root view,” however, as it applies to 
China.51  He maintains that the political system in combination with 
the legal system in China is the true root of corruption.52  To support 
this hypothesis, Yao draws on historical examples of the early Han 
and Tang Dynasties as periods with rule of law and no serious 
corruption.  In contrast, Yao suggests, “the darkest periods in China’s 
history are all related to a corrupt political system and to the illegal 
behaviors of a tiny group of bigwigs or aristocrats who were protected 
by a fatuous and self-indulgent ruler.”53  According to Yao, rather 
than a cultural phenomenon, corruption in China is merely a 
consequence of the faulty political system compounded by the faulty 
legal system.54   
 It is suggested by this article that, although Yao and other 
scholars do not to admit it, there is indeed a culture of corruption in 
China.  It is shaped, in part, by the political and legal systems, as well 
as by the economic systems, that Yao indicates are the sole cause of 
corruption.  In addition to the factors mentioned previously in this 
                                                 
50
  Shuntian Yao, Privilege and Corruption: The Problems of 
China’s Socialist Market Economy – New Perspectives on Transition Economics: 
Asia, Vol. 61 No. 1 AM. J. OF ECON. & SOC. 279  (Jan. 2002). 
 
51
  Id. 
 
 
52
  Id. at 281-85. 
 
53
  Id. at 282. 
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  Id. at 280-85. 
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article,55 as generally coalescing into a culture of corruption in a given 
country, certain historical and sociopolitical factors found in China 
also combine to define and color the prevailing culture of corruption 
in that country.  These include a centuries-old Confucian sense of 
strict hierarchy and order, and a tradition of tributary payments to 
government officials.  They also include the long-standing traditions 
of guanxi, “whereby ‘personal connections’ among government 
officials and firm managers control the allocation of resources . . . . [a] 
response, rooted in Chinese culture, to an underdeveloped system of 
property rights and contract law.” 56  Finally, the Chinese culture of 
corruption is also shaped by contemporary popular attitudes, the 
Communist nature (and interventionist stance) of the state, and the 
state’s response to corruption.57 
 No one disputes that China is currently in a “dark period” of 
extensive and pervasive corruption, a “cancer of the Chinese 
society.”58   Prominent journalists in China decry that “[c]orruption in 
China’s system reaches every level and can’t be solved”59 and even 
ponder whether some aspects of corruption in China are “one hundred 
times worse even than that of Indonesia under Suharto’s ruling.”60  It 
                                                 
55
  See supra pp. 2, 7-8. 
 
56
  C. Simon Fan & Herschel I. Grossman, Incentives and Corruption 
in Chinese Economic Reform 3 (Mar. 2000), http://www.anti-
corr.ru/archive/Incentives%20and%20corruption%20in%20Chinese%20Economic
%20Refor m.pdf (internal citations omitted) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 
57
  See generally MARTIN STUART-FOX, A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA 
AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: TRIBUTE, TRADE AND INFLUENCE 11-14, 20-22 (2003).  The 
evolution and nature of Chinese culture itself and the impact of Confucianism on 
present-day issues facing China (a controversial and complex issue in itself) is well 
beyond the scope of this article.  A good discussion of China’s cultural history, 
including the Confucian emphasis on hierarchy and order, and the tributary system 
that historically existed both within the Middle Kingdom and with its neighbors, is 
provided generally in Martin Stuart-Fox’s A Short History of China and Southeast 
Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence.  As noted above, other factors include popular 
local culture and history, the nature of the state, type of corruption, actors involved, 
and political responses and motivation to curtail corruption (or not).  Id. at 6. 
 
58
  Yao, supra note 50. 
 
59
  Wang Fang & Wang Zhen, Corruption Fuels China’s 
“Overheated” Economy, THE EPOCH TIMES (P.R.C.), Jun. 17, 2004, 
www.theepochtimes.com/news/4-6-17/21997.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
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is reported by the media that “[c]orruption has long been rife in 
Chinese society, where government and party officials control access 
to business licenses and a host of other vital permits.”61   In that 
context, corruption “takes the form of rules, edicts and certificates, all 
requiring extra fees rather than blunt requests for money.”62 
 Significantly, the Chinese culture of corruption appears to be 
cultivated and used surreptitiously by the Communist Party and the 
government to achieve their social, political and economic ends.  
Although the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee issued a 
36-page policy paper in 2004 calling corruption “a life and death 
struggle” for the Party,63 such statements appear to be, at best, mere 
window-dressing.  For example, it has been observed that the Party 
has an incentive to allow corruption as an alternative to Western-style 
compensation and that the government may only selectively enforce 
laws that prohibit corrupt practices.  Consistent with long-standing 
propaganda that “every Communist Party member is a selfless ‘public 
servant of the people,’” corruption allows the government to pay low 
salaries, but with the recognition that higher compensation will be 
earned through rent-seeking schemes by public officials.64  In some 
ways, payment of bribes and administrative “facilitation” fees is 
analogous to, and perhaps more effectively and fairly administered 
than, performance-based bonuses paid in the West.  Chengze Simon 
Fan and Herschel I. Grossman argue: 
 
Corruption, whether in the form of 
tanwu shouhui or nuoyong gongkuan, 
                                                                                                                  
60
  Hu Ping, On Corruption with “Chinese Characteristics”, 
ASSOCIATION FOR ASIAN RESEARCH, Sept. 30, 2002, 
http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/939.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 
 
61
  Mary Hennock, China’s graft: Tough talk, old message, BBC 
NEWS ONLINE, Sept. 24, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3693714.stm 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
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63
  See, e.g., id.; China Leaders Warn of Corruption, BBC NEWS 
ONLINE, Sept. 27, 2004,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3692530.stm (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
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  Chengze Simon Fan & Herschel I. Grossman, Entrepreneurial 
Graft in China, PROVIDENCE J., May 3, 2001, at B5, available at 
http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Herschel_Grossman/papers/pdfs/chinaop.pdf. 
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mitigates the problem of measuring and 
monitoring economic performance 
because local officials who make the 
largest economic contribution are likely 
to be able to extract the largest fees or 
nepotistic favors or to have the most 
valuable property to appropriate.  Also 
the compensation that local officials 
obtain through corruption, particularly in 
the form of bribery, is paid by local 
firms, which have the best information 
on the performance of local officials.65 
 
In addition, although Western-style explicitly-paid higher salaries and 
bonuses based on economic performance might benefit many public 
officials, there are also many Chinese officials who do not have any 
direct economic role and, therefore, would be bypassed by such 
rewards.  As has been observed:  
 
[a]n explicit system of material 
incentives and rewards for economic 
performance would undermine the 
political and social standing of those 
government officials and Party members 
who are not involved in economic 
activities.  Because the Communist Party, 
like any political organization, is a 
potentially fragile coalition, jealousy and 
discontent, especially in the army, would 
threaten to destabilize and to undermine 
its cohesiveness.66 
 
Thus, rent-seeking and other corrupt activities by public officials 
become a compensation scheme that may, at least in the short run, 
benefit the Communist Party and the government despite their public 
pronouncements to the contrary.  This phenomenon contributes 
significantly to the culture of corruption in China. 
                                                 
65
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66
  Id. 
  
 
 
18 ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW & POLICY JOURNAL;  Vol. 8, Issue 1 (Fall 2006) 
 
 Notwithstanding the beneficial use of corruption as an 
incentive program for public officials, however, the Communist Party 
and the government do have an incentive to selectively prosecute 
some officials for corruption.  When reports of major corruption 
crack-downs are published, it reflects well on the Communist Party 
both in China and abroad.  In addition, selective prosecution of 
corruption furthers strong internal cohesiveness and absolute power 
by the Party and supports the Party’s hierarchical structure.  Where 
every official knows that another (especially a higher-ranking) official 
could successfully charge him with corruption, “lack of exposure is in 
effect special treatment for which the official gratefully exchanges his 
political support.”67   Public officials whose loyalty to the Party is 
questioned or who become too greedy can be reigned in.  High-profile 
prosecutions do occur and the media does periodically tout the 
successes of government anti-corruption campaigns – such as a China 
News Service report that Beijing recovered as much as 700 million 
yuan (US$84 million) in the first year of the government’s campaign 
against corruption.68  Finally, as discussed in the last section of this 
article, corruption needs to be tightly controlled, even if it is not fully 
discouraged by the Party.  Ultimately, corruption is highly inefficient 
and disruptive to China’s economy and causes quantifiable economic 
loss despite the country’s growing economy. 
 Significantly, it is the manner in which the Chinese 
government has co-opted the culture of corruption in that country that 
distinguishes it from Indonesia and other countries that also 
experience a strong culture of corruption.  In China and Indonesia 
alike, the governments insist that they are fighting corruption and 
trumpet their high-profile successes.  The public and the press in both 
countries vociferously decry the state of corruption in public 
administration; but only in Indonesia does it appear that the 
government actually has an incentive to eliminate corruption.   
Despite modest GDP growth in Indonesia, corruption 
significantly suppresses business investments and overall economic 
development.  By contrast, China may benefit in the short-term from 
corruption.  The following suggests that, although corruption in China 
poses a substantial cost to the economy in terms of inefficiencies and 
                                                 
67
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68
  700 Million Yuan Recovered in One-year Campaign Against 
Corruption: Report, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Oct. 31, 2001) (P.R.C.), 
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actual yuan lost, Chinese economic growth paradoxically continues to 
outpace every other economy in Asia. 69 
 
IV. CORRUPTION AS ANTITHETICAL TO ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: INDONESIA AND CHINA COMPARED 
 
 Most people would agree that, as an ethical matter, most forms 
of corruption are undesirable.  Moreover, as is noted in the 
discussions above, there is widespread lip service paid to the 
eradication of corruption.  But, the question of whether fighting 
corruption should be a “true priority or merely a rhetorical one” 
remains hotly debated.70   A great deal of ambiguity remains with 
respect to whether corruption is good, bad, or irrelevant for economic 
development,71 especially in countries like China that simultaneously 
have a vigorous economy and yet an entrenched culture of corruption.   
 Many scholars promoting “rule of law” as a development 
strategy enthusiastically embrace anti-corruption measures.  Rather 
than a purely economics-based approach, these scholars look at the 
inter-relationships of investment, economic growth, and the strength 
of public institutions.  They advocate the elimination of corruption “to 
avoid squandered resources, to promote security and predictability, to 
inspire confidence, eliminate price distortions and promote an 
efficient distribution of resources,” 72  albeit in the interests of 
encouraging development.  They further insist that “corruption 
somehow drains resources from the system as a whole – its costs are 
costs of transactions, not costs of the product or service purchased.”73  
                                                 
69
  See, e.g., J.A.-MUND, N. BRANDT & S. HANSAKUL, CHINA-INDIA 
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If those transaction costs are removed, they believe, the whole 
economy improves.  There is some ambiguity in their research, 
however, as to the separate effects of corruption vis-à-vis other factors 
contributing to poor quality public institutions.74 
 Still other scholars, economists as well as non-economists, 
argue that corruption is actually beneficial to poor quality institutions.  
Corruption is viewed as the grease that makes the otherwise rigid 
machinery of government function smoothly.  According to this 
“functionalist”75 view, corruption promotes certain efficiencies.  For 
example, in the case of competitive bidding for government contracts, 
where the highest bidder in bribes is awarded the contract, a certain 
“allocation efficiency is maintained, as only the lowest-cost firm can 
afford the largest bribe.”76  In addition, according to the functionalists, 
corruption also encourages bureaucrats to work harder, acting as a 
sort of piece rate for government work.  Moreover, it supposedly 
permits entrepreneurs to circumvent or at least navigate efficiently 
through an otherwise slow-moving and burdensome regulatory 
framework.  So-called “speed money” paid to expedite administrative 
action or to reduce delay in public administration, has been 
demonstrated (using complex Nash equilibrium game theory) to 
actually reduce inefficiencies in public administration by speeding up 
the overall queue for services, thus minimizing waiting costs for 
everyone in the queue.77  This is especially true in those countries 
with excessive bureaucratic regulations and discretion. 78   Samuel 
                                                 
74
  World Bank Report, supra note 12, at 15. 
 
75
  Also referred to as “revisionist”, functionalism was largely a 
response arising in the 1960s to the moralist view. See generally Gillespie & 
Okruhlik, supra note 5, at 78.  Function is the ultimate consideration; the end 
justifies the means.  Functionalists have also characterized as “positive functions” 
the corrupt political machines and systems of patronage controlled by powerful 
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Huntington has succinctly captured the essence of this argument, 
colorfully asserting that “[i]n terms of economic growth the only 
thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralized, dishonest 
bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, honest 
bureaucracy.”79 
 The flip side of the functionalist coin is “post-functionalism,” 
an approach that began in the 1970s in an attempt to rebut 
functionalism. 80   Warning that “academia, state and society must 
rouse themselves from the autonarcotic effects of the ‘functional 
corruption’ myth,” 81  post-functionalists argue that corruption has 
dysfunctional consequences for the economy and society generally.  
They maintain that “corruption wastes revenues and resources that 
might be utilized elsewhere, erodes the trust and loyalty granted to 
political leaders by their followers, and solidifies inequities in the 
apportionment of goods in favor of certain strata of society.”82  In 
their view, corruption also stifles innovation, entrepreneurship, and 
both domestic and foreign productive investment.  It also encourages 
even more excessive and discretionary regulation. 83   As for the 
“grease the machinery” argument, it has been observed that corrupt 
officials actually may be incentivized to “cause more administrative 
delays in order to attract more bribes.”84  Such deliberate delays may 
also occur where public officials have no ability to speed up the 
process in any event, and they are instead bribed to slow down the 
process with respect to a payor’s competitors.85  Finally, the post-
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functionalists point to research which indicates that even where 
corruption has some short-term benefits to the economy, it still leads 
ultimately to dysfunction.  In a number of countries studied, 
corruption has led to smuggling, black market economies, mass 
starvation, imposition of martial law, and the complete disintegration 
of economy and society, in general.86  Moreover, corruption feeds 
upon itself, “blocking organizational change and societal reform . . . 
[and as reform consequently] becomes increasingly onerous to 
achieve, more corruption is fostered as a remedy to existing 
corruption.”87 
 It is suggested in this article that both the functionalist and the 
post-functionalist positions have merit, depending upon the specific 
country under consideration.  As the following discussions indicate, 
corruption in Indonesia appears to be a deterrent to more than modest 
economic growth and development.  In China, on the other hand, 
credible research indicates that economic development continues to 
race forward, even though corruption’s inherent inefficiencies and 
misallocation of resources is costing the economy heavily and likely 
will be quite harmful in the long term. 
 
 A. The Economic Impact of Corruption in Indonesia 
 
 Despite the wide-spread culture of corruption in Indonesia, 
there has been relatively little research quantifying the economic 
impact.  It is widely asserted that the “crony capitalism” and overall 
corruption of the Soeharto regime – thirty-two years of a 
dysfunctional “black state” 88  – was a root cause of Indonesia’s 
                                                                                                                  
approval any faster given the multiple bureaucrats involved in the process, yet [who] 
willingly offered his services to slow the approval process for rival companies.”  Id. 
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  See Werner, supra note 4, at 148-49.  It is interesting that 
functionalists counter-argue that corruption actually helps prevent violence and 
lawlessness in some circumstances.  For example, functionalists argue that those 
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violence against them.  Id. at 148.  Similarly, others suggest that corruption may be 
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economic crisis in the late 1990s.89  Moreover, the media has not been 
shy about proclaiming the dire economic consequences of corruption 
in Indonesia more recently.  Headlines exclaim, “Investors desert 
Indonesia as rot of corruption sets in.”90  It is reported that “[m]illions 
of Indonesians face poverty as investors continue to desert the country 
largely because of rampant corruption and collapsing 
infrastructure,”91  and that “[p]roblems with regional autonomy and 
increasing demands for bribes are further slowing Indonesia’s exports 
in a highly competitive regional market.”92  The media declares that 
“[t]he President must decide whether corruption eradication is part of 
economic recovery, the improvement of public services, the 
efficiency of the state budget or just about improving Indonesia’s rank 
in the Corruption Perception Index survey by [Transparency 
International].  Each option has its consequences and requirements.”93   
Moreover, in a recent survey, Doing Business in Indonesia 2005, the 
World Bank reportedly “confirmed that Indonesia is not attractive for 
foreign investors.  To invest in Indonesia requires more time, more 
complex procedures and much more money, all because of 
corruption.”94 
 Yet, while it generally is accepted that corruption is hurting 
the Indonesian economy, there is little empirical data specifically 
examining its effects.  As such, this article looks at several key factors 
of corruption present in Indonesia that are regarded as hindering 
economic development.  It is suggested that these factors, consistent 
with anecdotal evidence reported in the press and by several surveys 
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conducted by the World Bank and organizations such as Transparency 
International, are in fact crippling the Indonesian economy. 
  Possibly the most significant factor antithetical to economic 
development in Indonesia is what has been characterized as a 
“shadow system”95 or extralegal administrative system parallel to the 
official public administration.  This shadow system was established 
especially during the thirty-two years of Soeharto’s New Order rule, 
and while not as all-encompassing as it was during that regime, 
vestiges of it remain.  Business people still complain, for example, of 
corruption in the courts and the instability and unpredictability that 
this injects into business transactions.96  The law is largely irrelevant 
in the face of powerful connections or money.97   As a prominent 
scholar on Indonesia has observed, in the wake of Soeharto’s 
systematic co-option of all formal administrative institutions in 
Indonesia, “there is really nothing left to work with . . . there’s 
corruption everywhere.”98  Even today: 
 
[t]he result is a highly developed legal 
formalism (hard law) and public rhetoric; 
seemingly impenetrable and secretive 
politics; state sanctioned “corruption” 
and legal informality in practice (soft 
law norms); and apparent irrelevance 
and absurdity in the practice of law by 
reason of it being the interface between 
the two systems.99 
 
Apart from the political and legal consequences of such a shadow 
system, such pervasive corruption is also socially and economically 
parasitic and exploitive: 
 
It is not a self-sufficient or stand-alone 
system but depends on co-existing 
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economic and social systems, for 
example, on the agricultural economy; 
on markets or state enterprises; on the 
self-employed; on small and medium 
enterprises; on the informal or black 
economy operating outside, or on the 
contestable margins of, the law.100 
 
Corruption in Indonesia “interpenetrates these and other systems and 
lives off them.”101  It fails to produce any tangible socio-economic 
benefits and it is a highly inefficient use of resources.  As one scholar 
notes, corruption in Indonesia “comprises essentially non-productive 
behaviours or behaviours excessively costly to the host.  It does not, 
in economists’ terms, use resources efficiently nor give people the 
incentive to engage in productive activities.”102 
 Significantly, it is likely that administrative corruption in 
Indonesia also undermines the country’s macroeconomic stability by 
siphoning off government revenues and encouraging excessive 
government spending.  As noted in a World Bank report on corruption 
and economic development: 
 
[t]his can happen through corruption in 
tax and customs departments, through 
debt incurred when the scrutiny of 
finance ministries and central banks is 
bypassed, through contracts that are 
awarded to high-cost bidders or without 
competitive tendering, and through the 
general erosion of expenditure control.  
Excessive debt may be incurred 
thorough “white elephant” investment 
projects that owe their origin, in part, to 
bribes.  Macroeconomic stability may 
also be threatened by debt guarantees 
and other off-budget contingent 
liabilities agreed to in corrupt 
                                                 
100
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101
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transactions without public scrutiny.  It 
may also be threatened by fraud in 
financial institutions, leading to loss of 
confidence by savers, investors, and 
foreign exchange markets.103 
 
In similar fashion, the diverting of public resources for personal use 
(such as construction materials intended for public works used on 
private homes or even misappropriated and sold by public officials) 
also disrupts economic stability and growth in favor of non-
productive resource allocations.104 
 Perhaps the greatest effect of corruption on the Indonesian 
economy is both foreign and domestic investors’ reluctance to invest 
in Indonesia.  In much the same way that weeds crowd healthy plants 
out of a garden, widespread bribery and related rent-seeking by public 
officials “imply declining profitability on productive investments 
relative to rent-seeking investments, thus tending to crowd out the 
former.”105  Exacerbating this effect, in fact, increased rent-seeking 
makes further rent-seeking less costly relative to the cost of 
productive investment. 106   Moreover, as rent-seeking increases, 
entrepreneurial investment is particularly hard-hit.  Compared to 
existing and static businesses, new or expanding businesses often are 
more at the mercy of public officials who issue licenses and permits.  
The costs of paying bribes to these officials, for example, can 
undermine the ability to predict start-up or expansion costs (essential 
for attracting or accurately allocating capital investment) and can 
disproportionately increase those costs. 107   Innovators and 
entrepreneurs may decide not even to enter the market because of 
moral compunctions over paying bribes, as well as a fear of getting 
caught.108  This decline in competitiveness and diversity in the market 
also negatively affects the economic development overall.109 
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 The economic cost of corruption and a reluctance to invest has 
been the subject of a number of important studies focused on 
developing countries.  International Monetary Fund economist Paolo 
Maoro, for example, found that “[t]he negative association between 
corruption and investment, as well as growth, is significant.”110  In 
one study, Maoro argues that “if a given country were to improve its 
corruption “grade” from 6 out of 10 to 8 out of 10, its investment-
GDP ratio would rise by almost 4 percentage points and its annual 
growth of GDP per capita would rise by almost half a percentage 
point.”111  A similar study by another IMF economist, Shang-Jin Wei, 
examined the effects of taxation and corruption on international direct 
investment from fourteen source countries to forty-five host countries.  
He concluded that an increase in corruption level in a host country 
would decrease foreign direct investment.  Illustrating his conclusion, 
Wei points out that an increase in the corruption level of a relatively 
low-corruption country such as Singapore to that of a high corruption 
country such as Mexico “would have the same negative effect on 
inward FDI as raising the tax rate by eighteen to fifty percentage 
points, depending on the specification.”112  While limited attention 
has been paid to how these factors specifically affect Indonesia’s 
economy, the considerable prevalence of rent-seeking by public 
officials in Indonesia113 indicates that these factors would adversely 
                                                                                                                  
108
  This may be particularly true not only for domestic investors, but 
especially for U.S. investors who are subject to U.S. law prohibiting payment of 
bribes to foreign officials and other foreign corrupt practices.  But see, Rubin, supra 
note 19, at 268 (citing a study that implies that American investors “indulge in 
bribery practices to compete, and risk prosecution under United States law.”). 
 
109
  See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Role of the World Bank in 
Controlling Corruption, LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 93, 97-98 (1997). 
 
110
  Maoro, supra note 78, at 683.  
 
111
  Paolo Maoro, The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, 
and Government Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis, in CORRUPTION AND THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 83, 91 (Kimberly Ann Elliott, ed., 1997).  See also, Maoro, 
supra note 78, at 683. 
 
112
  Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing is Corruption on International 
Investors?, Vol. 82 No. 1 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 1, 8, available at 
http://www.nber.org/~wei/data/wei2000a/wei2000a.pdf. 
 
113
  See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 23, at 92-99. 
 
  
 
 
28 ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW & POLICY JOURNAL;  Vol. 8, Issue 1 (Fall 2006) 
 
affect the economy in that country. 
 
 B. The Economic Impact of Corruption in China 
 
 It is interesting that much of the recent impetus for 
quantitative analysis and the collection of empirical evidence on the 
effects of corruption on economic development has been propelled by 
the apparent success of the Chinese economy despite significant 
corruption.  As Shang-Jin Wei points out at the beginning of his study, 
he was motivated to conduct his research because “China has rampant 
corruption according to various newspaper accounts as well as 
surveys of business executives.  Yet, for every year in the last four, 
China has been the largest developing host of international investment.  
Even its FDI flow-to-GDP ratio has been among the highest among 
developing countries.”114   While the effects of corruption in other 
developing economies, such as Indonesia’s, appear to be directly and 
immediately antithetical to economic development and growth, China 
appears on the surface to present a paradox. 
 Contemporary conventional wisdom – especially as 
promulgated by scholars at the World Bank and others promoting 
(good) governance and its virtual doppel-ganger, anti-corruption 
efforts –  insists that: 
 
countries with stable government, 
predictable methods of changing laws, 
secure property rights and a strong 
judiciary enjoy higher rates of 
investment and growth than countries 
lacking such institutions.  Indeed, a 
number of multiple-country empirical 
studies have shown that rule of law and 
enforceable property rights are positively 
correlated with growth.115 
 
In addition, there is significant empirical evidence to suggest that 
corruption negatively correlates with economic development, such as 
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the case of Indonesia.  Yet in China, despite an apparent lack of rule 
of law and at least tacitly state-sanctioned (albeit somewhat controlled) 
administrative corruption, a present-day economic miracle appears to 
be continuing unabated.  The reasons for this are complex.  However, 
recent studies do indicate that corruption is negatively affecting 
economic development in China, despite the current growth. 
 Unlike other developing countries, China presents a unique set 
of circumstances.  Much of the economic growth is “attributed to 
cultural factors, a distinct form of ‘Chinese capitalism,’ a guanxi-
based rule of relationships, clientelism and corporatism. 116  
Importantly, “[w]hat they all share in common is an emphasis on 
relationships as a substitute for rule of law.”117  However, corruption 
itself is also a significant factor fueling economic growth.  As 
discussed previously in this article, it is suggested that the Chinese 
Communist Party uses corruption as a form of “bonus” or “incentive” 
program to encourage greater economic performance by public 
officials.118  Thus, public officials who work hard and contribute the 
most economically may also get the most back in bribes and 
“facilitation” fees.  Public officials also are incentivized to undertake 
local development projects, and to attract both domestic and foreign 
investment in those projects, by the opportunity to benefit from 
corrupt payments they will receive.119  While misallocation of scarce 
resources and an incoherent distribution according to competing local 
interests, rather than fundamental market principles, may distort the 
economy in the long-run, 120  corruption does push the economy 
forward in the short run. 
 Partly as a result of enthusiastic economic development efforts 
by local officials who stand to gain from increased rent-seeking 
opportunities, and partly due to a “lemming effect” by foreign 
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investors, much of the economic growth in China is attributed to 
foreign investors who are flocking to invest there, despite the rampant 
corruption.   In the past, many foreign investors lacked sufficient 
information with which to make a well-reasoned and informed 
decision about investing in China. They invested despite the risks and 
difficulties involved in navigating a corrupt and unpredictable 
landscape. 121   But it has also been observed that ignorance, more 
recently, may not be the only excuse: 
 
Eyes dazed by the (fictive) promise of a 
market of 1.3 billion captive consumers, 
foreign investors have been willing to 
discount or ignore the considerable risks 
of doing business in China . . . [Some of 
these] decisions have been driven not by 
any long term strategic plan but rather 
by organizational politics and dynamics.  
Even senior management of major 
multinational companies at times 
appears to have been swept up in the 
hype over the Pac-Rim century, and 
rushed to enter China simply because 
others were doing so . . . In other cases, 
lower level management saw China as a 
good place to advance their careers and 
aggressively pursued projects.122 
 
 In addition to increased foreign investment, much of the 
economic growth in China is attributed to other factors unique to 
China.  These clearly include short-term phenomena. Government 
programs promoting the “reallocation of labor from low to high 
productivity sectors, in particular from agriculture to manufacturing 
and services,” for example, figure prominently in promoting 
economic development. 123   Such short-term phenomena appear 
largely unaffected by corruption, although long-term productivity 
within each sector could suffer. 
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 The nature of the state and the nature of corruption in China 
are also important factors contributing to the proportionately more 
limited impact of corruption in China than in other countries.  For 
example, building on a well-established institutional legacy, the 
Chinese state remains strong and well-disciplined as it progresses 
with economic reforms.  The reforms are gradual and accomplished 
through existing state institutions controlled by the Communist 
Party.124  Moreover, the “Chinese regime has not only preserved old 
mechanisms [for discipline] but also created new ones to deal with the 
prevention, discovery, and control of corruption.”125  As such, it is 
able to effectively “limit the nature and impact of corruption.”126 
 The nature of Chinese corruption itself is also an important 
factor mitigating the negative effects of corruption on economic 
development.  It is significant that most of the corruption in China is 
in the form of rent-seeking and “profit-sharing”, 127  rather than 
outright theft of public money.128  The potential positive short-term 
effects on the economy from rent-seeking, such as incentives for local 
economic development efforts, have been discussed above.  Profit-
sharing also is regarded as a type of corruption which “may be the 
least harmful and could even lead to good social results.”129  With 
respect to the development of township and village enterprises, for 
example, it has been observed that exchanging profit shares for 
commercial privileges granted by local officials actually has helped 
the growth of those local enterprises.130  Further, it has been observed 
that money derived from profit-sharing (and to a lesser extent from 
rent-seeking) is more likely to be reinvested in a country’s economy 
than is money derived from other types of corruption.  Although there 
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is a lack of conclusive empirical evidence in this respect, reinvestment 
of corrupt money in the Chinese economy may serve to lessen capital 
losses incurred through corruption. 
 Despite the apparently more controlled and limited impact of 
corruption in China, particularly as compared with countries such as 
Indonesia, corruption is still seen as causing “prodigious economic 
losses for the country and its people.” 131   The reduced economic 
output and inefficiencies that result from corruption in China are 
draining the Chinese economy.132  One of the first studies estimating 
total economic losses resulting from Chinese corruption over the 
period 1995-1998 indicated that is was 13.2-16.8 percent of GDP.133  
A further study based on official statistics examined ten specific areas 
of “systematic economic losses caused by corruption” in China.134  It 
was estimated that for the period 1999-2001, the total economic losses 
“amounted to an annual average of 14.5-14.9 percent of GDP.”135  
Moreover, the author of both studies, Professor Angang Hu of 
Tsinghua University, acknowledged that, “[i]n reality, the forms of 
corruption are more than those listed, and the real losses are far 
beyond that . . . It is still an unknown economic ‘black hole.’”136  As 
he summarizes: 
 
China’s GDP accounts for over 10 
percent of the world’s total, ranking 
second only after the United States.  Up 
to the end of 2001, the GDP of China 
was approximately eight times of that of 
1978 (7.9 times), which is one of the 
great wonders in human history (to 
create capital at the fastest speed).  
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However, as a result of the large amount 
of economic losses and illegal capital 
transfer, which is caused by prevalent 
and systematic corruption . . . the 
increase was much less than 
eightfold.”137 
   
Whereas corruption has not fully prevented economic development 
from occurring in China, the inefficiencies and nonproductive 
transfers of resources it creates, combined with lost investment 
opportunities, appear to be significantly hurting the Chinese economy.  
Indeed, as reflected by Professor Hu’s studies, “[i]t is not 
exaggerating to say that, China may very well be the country with the 
most enormous economic losses in the world caused by corruption.138 
 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
 The degree to which corruption is antithetical to economic 
development continues to be researched and debated, particularly as 
the unprecedented growth of China’s economy continues relatively 
unabated.  It appears that virtually everyone agrees that corruption 
ultimately leads to institutional and administrative dysfunction and 
that it is antithetical to economic development in the long run.  There 
is a great deal of debate, however, regarding whether it can benefit 
economic development in the short run.  In considering the 
consequences of corruption in Indonesia and in China, it is apparent 
that whether – and the extent to which – corruption is antithetical to 
long-term and short-term economic development depends 
significantly upon contextual factors.  These include the culture, 
political history, nature of the state and the corruption occurring, and 
the response by the state to administrative corruption.  These also 
include less rational factors, such as those presently driving foreign 
investment in China despite rampant corruption.   
 In Indonesia, despite modest growth, corruption is holding 
back the economy and frightening away foreign investment.  The 
government has no choice but to act aggressively to eliminate 
corruption.  It is clearly antithetical to economic development in that 
country.  In China, on the other hand, the economy is still hurtling 
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forward despite corruption.  The state appears less eager to 
completely eliminate corruption, but instead it appears to be 
harnessing it in some positive ways.  Corruption is very costly to the 
Chinese economy, however, especially considering estimated losses 
between 13.2 and 16.8 percent of GDP over a two to three year period.  
Although the position of China’s public officials to less than 
vigorously combat corruption is consistent with the wisdom that 
“Thou shalt not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn,”139 there 
will eventually come a point at which China must stem its economic 
losses as a result of corruption.  Despite China’s enormous economic 
success, corruption is ultimately antithetical to the country’s future 
economic development.  
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